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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION

The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 78A-4-103(2)(j)
which involves cases transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

ARGUMENT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT MISCALCULATED CHILD SUPPORT
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Appellate Court gives the Trial Court considerable
discretion. Note Carsten vs. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174, 164 P.3d 429.
This issue was preserved on Appeal at page 578 of the Record.

ARGUMENT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO FACTOR
TAX CONSEQUENCES IN THE BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Appellate Court gives the Trial Court considerable
discretion. Note Carsten vs. Carsten, 2007 UT App. 174, 164 P.3d 429.
This issue was preserved on Appeal at page 14 of the Transcript of June 2, 2008.

STATUTES
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce -- Custody
consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate.
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best
interests of the child and, among other factors the court finds relevant, the
following:
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties;
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent;
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth,
quality, and nature of the relationship between a parent and child; and
(iv) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2.
(b) The court shall, in every case, consider joint custody but may award any
form of custody which is determined to be in the best interest of the child.
(c) The children may not be required by either party to testify unless the trier
of fact determines that extenuating circumstances exist that would necessitate the
testimony of the children be heard and there is no other reasonable method to
present their testimony.
(d) The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the
children's desires regarding future custody or parent-time schedules, but the
expressed desires are not controlling and the court may determine the children's
custody or parent-time otherwise. The desires of a child 16 years of age or older
shall be given added weight, but is not the single controlling factor.
(e) If interviews with the children are conducted by the court pursuant to
Subsection (1)(d), they shall be conducted by the judge in camera. The prior
consent of the parties may be obtained but is not necessary if the court finds that
an interview with the children is the only method to ascertain the child's desires
regarding custody.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court

finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child,
including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or has
attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that
evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to the other
parent.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not discriminate
against a parent due to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding
custody or determining whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose
of modifying an award of custody.
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or
determining whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of
modifying an award of custody, the parent with a disability may rebut any
evidence, presumption, or inference arising from the disability by showing that:
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's
ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other
resources available to supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical
and emotional needs of the child at issue.
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to adoption proceedings
under Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act.
(5) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or
against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody, but allows the
court and the family the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the
best interest of the child.

30-3-10.1. Definitions -- Joint legal custody -- Joint physical custody.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Joint legal custody":
(a) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent
by both parents, where specified;
(b) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to
make specific decisions;
(c) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified in the
order of joint legal custody;
(d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody
of and access to the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child
often requires that a primary physical residence for the child be designated; and
(e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary
caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child.
(2) "Joint physical custody":
(a) means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the
year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support;

(b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access to
the child by each of the parents, as required to meet the best interest of the child;
(c) may require that a primary physical residence for the child be designated;
and
(d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary
caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child.
30-3-10.2. Joint custody order -- Factors for court determination -- Public
assistance.
(1) The court may order joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both if
one or both parents have filed a parenting plan in accordance with Section 30-310.8 and it determines that joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both is
in the best interest of the child.
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by
ordering joint legal or physical custody, the court shall consider the following
factors:
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development
of the child will benefit from joint legal or physical custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and
reach shared decisions in the child's best interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive
relationship between the child and the other parent, including the sharing of love,
affection, and contact between the child and the other parent;
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce;
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents;
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to
reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody;
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the
child from conflict that may arise between the parents;
(h) the past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and
make decisions jointly;
(i) any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping; and
(j) any other factors the court finds relevant.
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a
preponderance of the evidence.
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint physical custody
may preclude eligibility for cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3,
Employment Support Act.
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle future
disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or
modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody or
joint physical custody through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring
ex parte orders to protect the child.

RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION – RULE 4-903
The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with
information it can use to make decisions regarding custody and parenting time
arrangements that are in the child’s best interest. This is accomplished by
assessing the prospective custodians’ capacity to parent, the developmental,
emotional, and physical needs of the child, and the fit between each prospective
custodian and child. Unless otherwise specified in the order, evaluators must
consider and respond to each of the following factors:
(5)(A) the child’s preference;
(5)(B) the benefit of keeping siblings together;
(5)(C) the relative strength of the child’s bond with one or both of the prospective
custodians;
(5)(D) the general interest in continuing previously determined custody
arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted;
(5)(E) factors relating to the prospective custodians’ character or status or their
capacity or willingness to function as parents, including:
(5)(E)(i) moral character and emotional stability;
(5)(E)(ii) duration and depth of desire for custody;
(5)(E)(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care;
(5)(E)(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug
abuse, excessive drinking or other cause;
(5)(E)(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past;
(5)(E)(vi) religious compatibility with the child;
(5)(E)(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent status;
(5)(E)(viii) financial conditions; and
(5)(E)(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another child or spouse; and
(5)(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the parties, or the
court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Cross-Appeal to the Court of Appeals with essential two claims on
appeal: (1) The Trial Court miscalculated child support and (2) The Trial Court failed
to include tax consequences in the balancing of the equities.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant has claimed many errors in reference to the Amended Findings of Fact,
Amended Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce. However, the claims
of the Appellant, in reference to some issues were not preserved on Appeal, other
claims were of Appellant’s Counsel own errors and one can not raise their own errors at
the Trial Court Level as the basis for an Appeal, seeking reversal.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Appellant sought extensions preserving her right of appeal. Each of the same
were unopposed.
Appellee has Cross Appealed seeking the Appellate Court to reverse and remand
on the issue of child support, tax consequences and for an award of attorneys fees on
Appeal.
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL
The Honorable Robert Faust ruled that child support would be based upon the
Appellant having (243) overnights and the Appellee having (122) overnights.
Appellee requested the Trial Court to adjust for the provisions of 30-3-35 Utah
Code Annotated, however the Trial Court did not do so.

Additionally Appellee requested the Trial Court to factor the $57,000.00 tax
consequence into the division of the equities, however the Trial Court did not do so.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Amended Decree of Divorce provides in paragraph #7 as follows: (Record at
page 621 – Note Addendum)
“7. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support in the amount of
$729.26 per month.”
At page 578 of the Record, the Appellee/Cross Appellant raised this exact issue
with the Trial Court, wherein he raised the following objections to the Findings of Fact
and referencing each Finding that Respondent objected as follows:
#7. The Respondent has the child 152 over nights as reflected in Exhibit A
attached hereto.
#9. The Petitioner now has earnings of $58,866.96 per year due to a pay increase.
#11. The child support does not contemplate the overnights the Respondent has
with the minor child as reflected in Exhibit A attached hereto, and child support
should be $485.56 as shown on the Work Sheet attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Respondent also objected to the following paragraphs of the Decree of Divorce,
found at page 578 of the Record:
#4. The Respondent has the child 152 over nights as reflected in Exhibit A
attached hereto.
#7. The child support should be $485.56, when the overnights are factored in as
reflected on Exhibit A and Exhibit B attached.
The Trial Court determined child support at page 253 of the Transcript as follows:
“The Court finds that the petitioner has an income of $4,032. gross and that the
respondent’s income is $7,920 gross resulting in a child support obligation total
between both parties of $1,157; thus, based upon a credit for the 20/10 split as

outlined in the new schedules found under Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, the petitioner’s
portion of her obligation is $393.38 per month and the respondent’s portion is
$729.26 after giving credits as outlined on the worksheet.”
As shown on page 258 of the Transcript, the Trial Court intended to divide the
equity in the home and then balance the Appellee’s interest in the home against the
retirement accounts, thereby granting to the Appellant all of the parties interest in the
marital home and granting to the Appellee a corresponding amount in the retirement
programs.
At page 258 of the transcript is the following:
“The Court is going to value the house at $290,000.00 based upon what the
appraisals were. So $290,000 divided by two will give each party $145,000
equity into the home. The first thing – so what we’re going to do, Mr. Walsh, if
it’s okay, put $145,000 for your client’s equity interest in the home and then
we’re going to start subtracting and adding from that figure which is half, okay?
Does that make sense?”
Appellee challenged this approach with the Trial Court at page 14 and following
of the Transcript of the hearing on June 2, 2008:
MR. WALSH: Appreciate your patience with us, Judge. It’s our belief, Your
Honor, at least we hope that you’ll see it this way, that you intended that there be
a factor in the analysis of taking money out of the 401K and the penalties and the
other things that are associated with that event versus having 100 per cent equity
in the home in pure cash as we laid out in our memorandum, he’s in a 28 percent
tax liability on the 401K. He wanted – the testimony before Your Honor is he
wanted to get his own home and so now to do this with the retirement of the
401K, this is going to have a 28 per cent federal tax consequence.
THE COURT: Back up. Why is the 290 going to have that – that’s the home
value not the 401K, right.
MR. WALSH: What we did, Judge, is we –
THE COURT: Yeah (inaudible).
MR. WALSH: -- she can have the whole home now, that’s your ruling.
THE COURT: Right.

MR. WALSH: She gets the house and we correspondingly give him his value in
the 401K.
THE COURT: That’s right.
MR. WALSH: So if he takes his value out of the 401K, he’s got a 28 per cent tax
liability to do that.
THE COURT: I’m with you.
MR. WALSH: Cause he wants to have a house now because he wants to have
these times with his boy. He’s only got another four years approximately to be
with his son. He wants to have a stable environment for his boy.
THE COURT: I’m with you.
MR. WALSH: He also has a 10 percent –
THE COURT: Penalty.
MR. WALSH: -- on the state level. So he’s there now at 38 percent for the
taking it out at this particular point. So it was our intent, Your Honor, it was out
(sic) understanding – it’s one thing over here to say we’re not going to give you
return on your investment. The house I would say three or four times the value
from this event to this event and say we’re going to give you zero here. But when
you go the other way around, he’s got a 38 percent detriment over here.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENT ONE: Cross Appellant claims that the Trial Court miscalculated
the child support because the Trial Court did not include the overnights in the
summertime nor the other provisions of 30-3-35 of the Utah Code Annotated in reference
to the Father’s parent time.
ARGUMENT TWO: Cross Appellant also claims that the Trial Court made a
mistake in failing to factor in the $57,000.00 tax consequence of the Father in the
division of the equities.

ARGUMENT ONE
APPELLANT’S CLAIMS THAT THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PROVISIONS OF 30-3-10 UCA AND RULE 4-903
ARE WITHOUT MERIT
At page 17 of the Blue Brief the Appellant states:
“In making a determination as to the future custody of a minor child, the
trial court is under obligation to take into account certain statutory considerations
as are specifically set forth in Utah Code 30-3-10 though 30-3-10.2. These
factors include and are part of the “best interests of the child test” which must be
analyzed by the trial court.”
At page 18 of the Blue Brief the Appellant argues:
“Custody evaluators are under stringent rules that they must identify and
explore every one of the criteria that is expressly set for (sic) in Rule 4-903(5).”
Appellant argues that the Trial Court failed to apply these statutory references and
therefore “the entry by the Court of an order of custody must fail and be reversed.”
These provisions of the Utah Code provide:
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce -- Custody
consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate.
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best
interests of the child and, among other factors the court finds relevant, the
following:
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties;
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent;
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth,
quality, and nature of the relationship between a parent and child; and
(iv) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2.
(b) The court shall, in every case, consider joint custody but may award any
form of custody which is determined to be in the best interest of the child.
(c) The children may not be required by either party to testify unless the trier
of fact determines that extenuating circumstances exist that would necessitate the
testimony of the children be heard and there is no other reasonable method to

present their testimony.
(d) The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the
children's desires regarding future custody or parent-time schedules, but the
expressed desires are not controlling and the court may determine the children's
custody or parent-time otherwise. The desires of a child 16 years of age or older
shall be given added weight, but is not the single controlling factor.
(e) If interviews with the children are conducted by the court pursuant to
Subsection (1)(d), they shall be conducted by the judge in camera. The prior
consent of the parties may be obtained but is not necessary if the court finds that
an interview with the children is the only method to ascertain the child's desires
regarding custody.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court
finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child,
including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the
noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or has
attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that
evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to the other
parent.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not discriminate
against a parent due to a disability, as defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding
custody or determining whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose
of modifying an award of custody.
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or
determining whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of
modifying an award of custody, the parent with a disability may rebut any
evidence, presumption, or inference arising from the disability by showing that:
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's
ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other
resources available to supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical
and emotional needs of the child at issue.
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to adoption proceedings
under Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act.
(5) This section establishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or
against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody, but allows the
court and the family the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the
best interest of the child.

30-3-10.1. Definitions -- Joint legal custody -- Joint physical custody.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Joint legal custody":
(a) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent
by both parents, where specified;
(b) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to

make specific decisions;
(c) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as specified in the
order of joint legal custody;
(d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody
of and access to the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of the child
often requires that a primary physical residence for the child be designated; and
(e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary
caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child.
(2) "Joint physical custody":
(a) means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the
year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support;
(b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody of and access to
the child by each of the parents, as required to meet the best interest of the child;
(c) may require that a primary physical residence for the child be designated;
and
(d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the primary
caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child.
30-3-10.2. Joint custody order -- Factors for court determination -- Public
assistance.
(1) The court may order joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both if
one or both parents have filed a parenting plan in accordance with Section 30-310.8 and it determines that joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both is
in the best interest of the child.
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by
ordering joint legal or physical custody, the court shall consider the following
factors:
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development
of the child will benefit from joint legal or physical custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and
reach shared decisions in the child's best interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive
relationship between the child and the other parent, including the sharing of love,
affection, and contact between the child and the other parent;
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce;
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents;
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to
reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody;
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the
child from conflict that may arise between the parents;
(h) the past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and
make decisions jointly;
(i) any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping; and
(j) any other factors the court finds relevant.
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a

preponderance of the evidence.
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint physical custody
may preclude eligibility for cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3,
Employment Support Act.
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle future
disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or
modification of the terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody or
joint physical custody through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring
ex parte orders to protect the child.
The Rules of Judicial Administration, specifically 4-903(5) provides:
The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with
information it can use to make decisions regarding custody and parenting time
arrangements that are in the child’s best interest. This is accomplished by
assessing the prospective custodians’ capacity to parent, the developmental,
emotional, and physical needs of the child, and the fit between each prospective
custodian and child. Unless otherwise specified in the order, evaluators must
consider and respond to each of the following factors:
(5)(A) the child’s preference;
(5)(B) the benefit of keeping siblings together;
(5)(C) the relative strength of the child’s bond with one or both of the prospective
custodians;
(5)(D) the general interest in continuing previously determined custody
arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted;
(5)(E) factors relating to the prospective custodians’ character or status or their
capacity or willingness to function as parents, including:
(5)(E)(i) moral character and emotional stability;
(5)(E)(ii) duration and depth of desire for custody;
(5)(E)(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care;
(5)(E)(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug
abuse, excessive drinking or other cause;
(5)(E)(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past;
(5)(E)(vi) religious compatibility with the child;

(5)(E)(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent status;
(5)(E)(viii) financial conditions; and
(5)(E)(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another child or spouse; and
(5)(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the parties, or the
court.
COUNTER POINT I:
Appellant did not preserve this issue at the trial level.
In the Blue Brief at page 4, the Appellant states:
ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court committing error
by not conducting a best interest test to determine custody or having the custody
evaluator enter a recommendation without fully complying with Rule 4-903 of the
Rules of Judicial Administration was preserved at trial by the trial court’s
admission that the court must examine certain factors to determine custody.
(R@682, page 20 and 35).
While Appellant claims that this issue was preserved at the trial level at (R@682,
page 20 and 35), such is not the case.
The Record at page 682 is merely the cover page for the transcript and, of course,
has nothing to do with the claim that Appellant raised this issue with the Trial Court so
that the Trial Court Judge could address the issue.
Additionally at page 20 of the Transcript, if this is what the Appellant is claiming,
the Trial Judge stated the following:
“THE COURT: Well, if it relates to the factors I need to look at, you’re welcome
to put on the evidence. Other than that, I don’t care. Okay?”
Additionally at page 35 of the Transcript, if this is what the Appellant is claiming,
the Trial Judge stated the following:
“THE COURT: The things that I need to look at is who has been the primary care
giver; which parent is better at giving personal care or attention rather than

surrogate care; whether there’s a factor to determine whether or not siblings
should be kept together or not. I guess we have a situation that’s different, there’s
no other kids. I need to know the relative strength of the child’s bond with both
of the prospective custodians and you’ve told me that there appears to be a child
preference slightly for his mother. I need to understand the stability of the
parents. It’s these kinds of factors that I need to hear your testimony on if you
have that type of information.?”
Hence, the Trial Judge appropriately identified the criteria outlined in Rule 4-903
of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
However, there is nothing here to substantiate the claim by the Appellant that she
somehow preserved her issue for appeal.
There is no basis whatsoever for the Appellant to claim that she somehow
challenged before the Trial Court the issue she is now raising on appeal.
Appellee submits that without raising the issue before the Trial Court the
Appellant can not now raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
To have preserved the issue now raised before this Court, the Appellant must
show how she raised the issue before Judge Faust so that he could address and correct the
same at the Trial Court level.
Merely showing this Court where the Trial Court correctly stated the law can
not now form the basis to say, “Here is where we asked the Trial Court to address the
issue we are now raising before the Court of Appeals.”
Appellee submits that since the Appellant did not raise the issues contained in
their Argument One, she has waived the same and she can not now raise it for the first
time on appeal.
The Appellate Courts as a general rule do not allow parties to raise issues not
raised at the Trial Court level, because the intent of this rule is to give the Trial Judge

“notice of the asserted error and . . . opportunity for correction at that time in the course
of the proceedings.” Note State vs. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276 (Utah, 2004).
Additionally, if the Appellant is claiming that the Court failed to address the
provisions of 30-3-10 and following of the Utah Code Annotated, the same argument
holds true.
The Trial Judge at page 35, expressly requested the Appellant to put on her
evidence regarding the provisions of 30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated.
At page 35 is the following:
“THE COURT: And how about in 30-310? (sic)
MS. HUNTSMAN: We’ll certainly ask her those and I’m sure she’s more than –
THE COURT: Okay, let’s go ahead. That’s where we need to go.”
Here the Trial Court Judge correctly stated the law and how the parties would
need to address the provisions of 30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated.
However, nowhere on this page or anywhere else in the Transcript or the Record
did the Appellant raise the issue before the Trial Court that she is now raising for the first
time on appeal.
The policy behind the requirement that issues must be raised at the trial level is
well settled. Trial Courts are best suited to consider all of the factors and elements that
go into a custody determination. Trial Courts have all of the evidence regarding the
issues and claims before them; while at the same time all of the collateral issues.
So for example, a trial judge may find that the child for various reasons would do
marginally better with his Mother; however, Mother may have no stable place to reside.

The resolution of the property issues plays into the resolution of the custody
issues.
The Appellate Courts are not set up to redo all that the Trial Judge does in a
divorce proceeding.
In the case of Trubetzkoy vs. Trubetzkoy, 2009 UT App 77, 205 P.3d 891 (also
cited by the Appellant) the Court held:
Despite a careful review of the extensive debate about the form and
content of the Findings and Conclusions, we find no indication that Wife alerted
the trial court to the need to make additional findings or conclusions. Instead,
Wife’s arguments were limited to the position that the evidence did not support
certain findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the district court.
Consequently, Wife may not challenge the adequacy of the findings of fact on
appeal. See In re K.F., 209 UT 4, 622 Utah Adv. Rep 11, 201 P.3d 985 (“Judicial
economy would be disserved if we permitted a challenge to the adequacy of the
detail in the findings to be heard for the first time on appeal.”) 438 Main St. vs.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801 (“(I)n order to preserve an issue for
appeal (,) the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial
court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” (alterations in original) (internal
quotation makes omitted)). Therefore we limit our review to the issue of whether
the trial court’s findings of fact were supported by sufficient evidence. See K.F.,
2009 UT 4, 201 P.3d 985; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) (“(T)he question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings…”)
Appellate Courts only address claimed errors made at the Trial Court level, hence
one is required to raise problems at the Trial Court level so that the Trial Judge, who is
best suited to address the same for many reasons, can address the same in the context of
the entire matter.
Here the Trial Judge was called upon to decide where the child would be best
placed “in the best interest of the child”.

That determination included where the child would stay when with his mother and
where the child would stay when with his father. Hence, the Trial Judge had to factor
which parent would be awarded the marital home
In awarding the marital home, the Trial Judge would have to determine the equity
in the same and how to fairly divide the same.
In that analysis the Trial Judge would have to determine if the Mom can afford to
keep the marital home with her income.
In that analysis the Trial Judge would have to determine how alimony would
factor in.
In that determination the Trial Judge would have to determine the allocation of
the marital debt, etc.
The relevant issues go on and on and on.
As a result, to raise issues for the first time on Appeal defeats the entire balancing
required at the Trial Court level and would require the Appellant Court to do the
balancing all over again.
Hence, for the Appellant to raise for the first time on Appeal, just one element of
the big picture, causes the Appellant Court to completely redo the whole divorce.
The balancing that the Trial Courts do in attempting to put the parties in the best
financial setting for future success is thwarted by taking even one small part of the
picture and putting it on the other side of the balance.
For this reason, and many more, Appellants are required to raise their issues with
the Trial Court so that they can all be factored into the total solution.

Appellant can not raise issues, on Appeal, that were not raised at the Trial Court
level and therefore this claim must be dismissed out right.

COUNTER POINT II:

The Amended Findings of Fact and Amended Conclusions of Law as well as the
Amended Decree of Divorce were prepared by Counsel for the Appellant, and so if the
claim here on appeal is that they were deficient for any reason, Appellant can not create
the problem and then be heard before the Court of Appeals on the very problem
Appellant herself created.
In this action, Counsel for the Respondent prepared the Amended Findings of
Fact, Amended Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce. Note the Record
at page 610 and following.
Appellant objected to the same and then after a series of post-trial motions and
hearings, Appellant submitted Amended Findings of Fact and Amended Conclusions of
Law and Amended Decree of Divorce which were signed by the Trial Court and are now
the subject of this appeal.
As noted in the Record at page 610, Appellant’s Counsel pressed the Court for a
whole new set of Findings and Conclusions; hence it is the Appellant’s own Counsel that
prepared the same.
The abundant case law is clear, that one can not create the problem at the Trial Court
level and then be heard on appeal on the very problem Appellant created. Utah Chapter
of Sierra Club vs. Air Quality Board, 2009 UT 76, (Utah, 2009).

COUNTER POINT III:

Not only did the Trial Court Judge correctly state the law in reference to custody
determinations as noted at pages 20 and 35 of the Transcript, the Trial Judge correctly
applied the law as found in 30-3-10 of the Utah Code Annotated and also Rule 9-403 of
the Rules of Judicial Administration.
At page 49 and following of the Transcript is the following testimony by the
Child Custody Evaluator:
“I’ll talk about 4903.(sic) Cameron prefers at this point the present schedule
which is a standard visitation schedule and has appreciated the flexibility his
parents have shown and the cooperation his parents have shown when he wants to
do something at church or something that interferes but Cameron’s stated
preference as per my conversation with his therapist yesterday was that he likes it
the way it is and he doesn’t want to increase overnights. Cameron’s siblings are
grown so there’s no benefit of keeping siblings together because they’re out of the
house. Both parents provide access to the siblings and they don’t denigrate the
siblings to him or interfere in any way. Cameron is more attached and
comfortable with this mother than his father because she was the primary care
giver although he was comfortable and enjoyed his father’s company and
provided multiple examples of that.
He was told about the homosexual pornography issue by his older brother and he
was confused about this initially. His therapist has really helped him with that.
It’s just that Cameron wants everyone to know that it doesn’t matter if his dad is
gay or his mom is gay, he loves his parents, period. He also was able to articulate
negative things about his mother, so there was no sense in terms of looking at
attachment or alienation or coaching by the mother because he was able to
criticize her roundly.
In general interest in continuing previously predetermined arrangements where
he’s happy and well adjusted, Cameron is finally recovering from the divorce and
separation and he, more than other adolescents has taken a very long time to do
that. Psychologically he is an anxious child, there’s been consistent data that he
doesn’t do well with change that he doesn’t initiate. Although now, he does not
show intense depression or anxiety, you know, that is debilitating he would like
and should have some flexibility in his schedule and I recommend that he have
the opportunity to experience his dad, not as a visitor, but as a person who will
allow normal teenage happenings in the home, meaning, it’s okay for your friends
to come over if you’re going to be here with me.

Factors relating to the character or status, moral character and emotional stability,
the father is in no way a child molester and there’s no concerns in that regard.
Mother is in no way a person who is overtly trying to hurt anyone but her anxiety
about uncertainty of the signals and sexuality in the marriage did this. I don’t
believe that she would ever try to at this point harm anyone in any way.
With regard to emotional stability, Mrs. Sellers is not in counseling. She has been
able to take responsibility for the inappropriate way in which she spread the news
of her husband’s looking at pornography. I talked with her psychologist whose
worked with her about dealing with, how to help herself not ruminate.
Duration and depth of desire? Both parents want custody and both parents were
initially worried about the other parent’s capacity. Personal versus surrogate care,
mother has the ability to provide more personal care although this child is now 14
and one-half years old and so it’s less of a pressing issue.
There were no concerns about drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes with
his parents, no involuntarily relinquishment of custody or the house. Both are
strong and faithful in their LDS faith and both support very much Cameron’s
practicing in the LDS faith. There’s no kinship issues.
Financial issues. The father did make more money than the mother and the
mother would rely in part on alimony and child support. It’s my understanding
she’s pursuing a master’s degree in order to better her financial situation.
Evidence of abuse of the child or spouse. I found no evidence of child abuse or
spousal abuse and so that’s all I’ve got.
Q. All right. And –
THE COURT: Excuse me, I’m sorry. No impairment in either’s parent ability?
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
THE COURT: Thank you.”
Appellee submits that any claim that the Trial Court committed reversible error in
failing to consider the factors outlined in 4-903 of the Rules of Judicial Administration is
wholly without any merit whatsoever.

Additionally, Appellee submits that any claim that the Trial Court committed
reversible error in failing to consider the factors outlined in 30-3-10 of the Utah Code
Annotated is wholly without any merit whatsoever, as well.
At page 52 of the Transcript, the Child Custody Evaluator testified as follows:

Q. (BY MS. HUNTSMAN) The factors under 30-310 (sic) are first were there
any issues or findings – what are your findings regarding past conduct,
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties?
A. I think that these parents are both struggling with issues that are- it’s
unfortunate to discuss in court regarding deeply held issues about sexuality. I
don’t consider them immoral in their behavior but only distressed at times and
I believe that those things are not perhaps completely resolved and they’ll
have to resolve them in their own personal work. But in terms of moral
character, I don’t believe these people have poor morals.
Q. All right. The next one, financial guardian, which parent is more likely to act
in the best interest of the child?
A. I believe that Mrs. Sellers is more open to suggestion and feedback about how
to manage her relationship with her child than perhaps Mr. Sellers is, only as
evidenced by the issue about how understanding that even though Cameron
might not want to spend time with him, it doesn’t mean that that comes from
his mother or anybody else. It’s just a natural teenage development. But in
terms of – I think that both of them are devoted to him.
Q. Findings regarding the extent of bonding between the parent and the child,
meaning the depth, quality and nature of the relationship?
A. Cameron is attached and bonded to both of his parents. He is more
comfortable by a fair degree and more spontaneous with his mother than with
his father.
Q. Do you feel the parents would be able to reach shared decisions in the child’s
best interest in this case?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And are both capable of encouraging or what would be your findings
regarding whether or not each parent is capable of encouraging, accepting a
positive relationship between the child and the other parent?

A. They’re both very adept at that. In fact, they’re more adept that just about any
parents I’ve seen in 180 custody evaluations despite their deep differences and
pain. The therapist also said, they don’t backstab and they’ve done the best
they can to keep Cameron out of it and they should be commended.
Q. Finally, do you have – what would be your findings regarding whether both
parents participated in raising the child before the divorce?
A. I think that the parties divided their duties in a traditional way so that Mr.
Sellers’ direct diapering, feeding, playing with was limited because of his
deep commitment to making sure the family was financially secure. So in
Cameron’s young childhood, JoAnn was, Mrs. Sellers was obviously more
participatory. At this juncture, however, I believe that both parents have the
capacity, interest and willingness to equally participate in whatever his needs
are from school, to church, to anything.
Q. We addressed the child’s preference. Maturity of the parents and their
willingness and ability to protect the child from conflict?
A. Excellent.
Q. Past and present ability of parents to cooperate with each other?
A. I think these parents have been able to, with regard to Cameron, have been
able to adjust schedules, be flexible and as per their reports and my
understanding, they’ve gone a good job.
MS. HUNTSMAN: I believe that is it.
THE COURT: And excuse me, and both parents work. So any care of the child
would have to be when the parents aren’t available would have to be?
THE WITNESS: My understanding is, Your Honor, that Mrs. Sellers’ schedule
ends when the school day ends and for the most part except for she may be
attending some classes. So typically she’s home after school.
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
Appellee submits that not only did the Trial Court correctly apply the law in
reference to 30-3-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, it was through Appellant’s Counsel
that the same occurred.

Hence, the claim that the Court failed to consider the provisions of 30-3-10 and
following of the Utah Code Annotated is without merit.
Appellee submits that in reference to 4-903 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration and in reference to the provisions of 30-3-10 of the Utah Code Annotated,
it was Appellant’s own Counsel that presented to the Trial Court the very evidence that
Appellant now claims was not presented to the Trial Court.

ARGUMENT TWO
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR BY ENTERING FINDINGS AND ORDERING
THE PARTIES TO EXERCISE JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES
MINOR CHILD WITHOUT THE PARTIES SUBMITTING A PARENTING
PLAN AND WITHOUT THE COURT DETERMINING THAT
JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILD?

At page 19 of the Blue Brief, Appellant submits the following argument:
“In order for joint legal custody to be ordered by the trial court, several statutory
provisions of the Utah Code must be complied with. These statutory directives
are two-fold. First, the trial Court must have received a parenting plan from one
or both of the parties. Second, the trial court must have specifically made a
determination that joint legal custody was in the best interest of the minor child.”
COUNTER POINT I:
Appellant never preserved this issue at the trial level.
At page 5 of the Blue Brief, Appellant states:
“ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court committing error
by not entering a parenting plan with its order that the parties exercise joint legal
custody, was preserved at trial with the trial court’s acceptance of the custody
evaluator recommendation (R@682, page 36 and 37) and Petitioner’s concerns
and rejection of such.

A simple review of R@682, page 36 and 37 shows that the Appellant never raised
any claimed defect before the Trial Court.
Page 682 of the Record is merely the cover page of the Transcript, and at page 36
and 37 of the Transcript there was no objection raised whatsoever to the “joint legal
custody”.
At the bottom of page 35, (in order to put the points raised there in context) and
continuing through the end of page 37 is the following:
MR. WALSH: This witness takes the view that there should be 20 days with
mom, 10 days with dad; that there should be joint physical and joint legal custody
and we’ll stipulate to that arrangement. I think the parties are in agreement with
that.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. WALSH: The hangup we’re having here –
THE COURT: Is the home.
MR. WALSH: Is the home. Does this kid have to stay in this brick and mortar
place or can he be in some other? Can he be in some duplex down the street and
that’s our hangup. So this is not a generic custody battle where we’re saying, run
it though the factors and run – and we argue about it all because we don’t have an
argument there. Very competent evaluation, we’re pleased with the result. We
think that’s in his best interest. The only issue is does it have to be in this home
and so I don’t know that it’s going to be helpful when you find that we’re not
asking for custody, to have spent the time going over each of those factors, is
going to be helpful to you.
MS. HUNTSMAN: And Your Honor, before we get there, my client has some
concerns about the 20-day, 10-day, the two overnights and I think it’s, I think
those are going to have be addressed as part of this. So…
THE COURT: Let me do this then. Doctor, can you give me your specific
recommendations of how you would propose the visitation go between the parties.
So you’re proposing No. 1, joint legal and physical custody between the parties,
right?
THE WITNESS: I proposed joint legal arrangement.

THE COURT: Join (sic) legal custody by both parties.
THE WITNESS: Yes sir.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: I proposed expanded visitation with dad and I didn’t make a
hard and fast recommendation. I had an aspirational recommendation but –
THE COURT: Okay, well –
THE WITNESS: -- That has that the mid-week overnight every week and
alternative weekends, Sunday to Monday, next morning. That’s an aspirational
recommendation because the child is quite anxious at about having that much
time as per his therapist and –
THE COURT: I’m lost then, what’s the 20-day, 10-day?
THE WITNESS: What that ends up –
THE COURT: Oh, you just add the totals for the month?
MR. WALSH: That’s right.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that’s how it works out.
MR. WALSH: For a 30-day period.
THE WITNESSES: That’s about how it works out.”
The Appellee has recited herein, the bottom of page 35, to put things in context,
the entire page 36 and the entire page 37 of the Transcript and so this Court can see that
there is no claim that there be any kind of written parenting plan.
Appellant did not object at all to anything regarding a parenting plan.
The best that can be said is that Ms. Huntsman had some concerns about the 20
day, 10 split.

But that does not rise to the level of pointing out any kind of problem before the
Trial Court so that the Trial Court can address the same, and resolve the same, at the Trial
level.
There was no claim there that, “We object, Your Honor, there should be a written
parenting plan, if you are going to order joint legal custody here.”
Appellee submits that this claim by the Appellant was never raised with the Trial
Court at all, and by virtue of the same, Appellant can not raise it for the first time on
Appeal, as she has waived the same.
In the case of Fairbanks vs. Fairbanks, 2010 UT App 31, (February 11, 2010) the
Utah Court of Appeals held:
Husband first argues that the trial court erred it is division of the marital estate.
Specifically, he challenges (1) the trial Court’s failure to acknowledge than he
contributed his separate property to the purchase of the parties’ homes
notwithstanding the credit given to Wife for contributions of her separate property
and (2) the trial court’s chosen method used in the division of the parties’ homes.
“’It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance the issue on appeal, the record
must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon.’” Holmstrom vs. C.R. England, Inc., 2000
Ut App 239, 8 P.3d 281 (quoting Salt Lake County vs. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). We do not see that Husband sufficiently raised these
issues below. Husband points us to no occasion where he requested the trial court
to acknowledge that he made separate contributions to the purchase of the parties’
homes or advanced his model for the equitable division of the homes. There is no
mention of these issues at trial, and the exhibits to which Husband points as
preserving the issues are far from self-explanatory and were not explained to the
trial court in a way that raised the issues to the court’s attention. “For an issue to
be sufficiently raised even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of the
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it.” James vs. Preston, 746
P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Thus, these issues are “deemed waived,
precluding this Court from considering their merits on appeal. “” Holmstrom,
2000 UT App. 239, (quoting Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655).
COUNTER POINT II:

As noted above, Appellant’s Counsel prepared the paper work for the Court to
sign in the Amended Findings of Fact and the Amended Conclusions of Law.
Appellant caused the exact problem she is now raising before the Appellate Court.
The Record shows at page 610, the Diana Huntsman prepared the final papers for
the Court and if requisite paperwork was omitted, she omitted the same. (Note Sierra)
COUNTER POINT III:
A careful review of the Amended Findings of Fact shows that the Appellant and
the Appellee do in fact have a written Parenting Plan controlling the issues regarding
custody, decision making, parent time, etc.
At page 611 of the Record is paragraph #5 and following, of the said Amended
Findings of Fact, which provides as follows:
“#5. Each of the parties is a fit and proper parent to be awarded joint legal
custody of the minor child, with the Petitioner being awarded primary physical
custody. Parent time shall be divided as follows:
A. The Court is adopting the 20/10 parent-time split proposed by the
custody evaluator. However, the Respondent may certainly have additional time,
if agreed upon.
B. The Respondent shall have parent time with the minor child on every
Tuesday, from the time that Cameron is out of school to and including
Wednesday morning when the child goes to school.
C. The Respondent shall have every other weekend beginning from the
time that Cameron is out of school on Friday to and including Monday morning
when the child goes to school.
D. The parties shall be bound by 30-3-35 of the Utah Code Annotated
regarding the additional times that the Respondent shall have parent-time with the
minor child.
6. The parties shall be bound by the provisions of 30-3-33 of the Utah
Code Annotated. However, the first option to provide child care will apply only if
the other parent is unavailable for a period of 4 hours or more.

7. By virtue of the foregoing, the Respondent shall have a total of one
hundred and twenty-two (122) over nights each year and the Petitioner shall have
a total of two hundred and forty-three (243) over nights each year.
8. The parties are free to take the child out of state and out of the United
States as long as each parent notifies the other parent in a timely fashion.
13. The parties shall talk together to reach a decision on all major issues.
If they cannot agree, they shall talk to Cameron’s therapist, and accept his input.
If they are still unable to resolve the issue, the therapist shall have the final say.”
Hence, the parties do in fact have a written Parenting Plan, which was fully
endorsed and approved by the Court and in fact expressly incorporated officially in the
said Amended Findings of Fact.
Again, Appellee acknowledges that Appellant has switched attorneys for purposes
of appeal, still it was Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant that created the exact issue
raised now as a problem with the Appellate Court.
COUNTER POINT IV:
Not only did the parties have a written parenting plan as outlined above, the
parties had actually applied the same and according to the Appellant herself, the same
had worked well between the parties.
Beginning on page 22, of the Transcript of the proceedings on June 2, 2008, is the
following dialogue in open Court:
“MR. WALSH: I find four hours to be a good rule now, Judge?
THE COURT: Fine.
MS. HUNTSMAN: That’s fine.
MR. WALSH: Okay, four hours.
THE COURT: Four hours.

MS. HUNTSMAN: Their evaluator has suggested it shouldn’t apply that but I
don’t care as long as there’s a set time.
THE COURT: I think they should. The parents should have access to their
children.
MS. HUNTSMAN: And the second one was that during the summer, there’s
going to be lot of time and I think you’ve addressed that. If you’re saying first right of
refusal, four hours, then the mom has the first right of refusal if dad is at work.
MR. WALSH: (Inaudible).
MS. SELLERS: So far we haven’t had any problem with that.
THE COURT: Excellent, congratulations.
MS. HUNTSMAN: Very good.”
Hence, not only did the parties have the requisite parenting plan, the parties had
actually applied the same, and according to the Appellant herself, “we haven’t had any
problem with that.”
Not only did the Appellant herself acknowledge the fact that there was a plan and
it worked well, Appellant’s Counsel admitted the same on page 24 of the Transcript of
proceeding on June 2, 2008:
“MR. WALSH: What do you want it to say, Your Honor? They have a program
where if they can’t agree that they’ve got a method whereby they can reach agreement
and have someone else decide.
MS. HUNTSMAN: Right, . . . “
In addition to all of the foregoing, the parties have entered into a stipulation and
agreement on the record regarding critical parts of the subject parenting plan.

On page 2 of the Transcript of the hearing on June 2, 2008, the parties agreed in
open Court and upon the record to the most critical part of the parenting plan, ie: Parent
time.
“MS. HUNTSMAN: Then we have some that we’re in disagreement on. So the
next thing that we agree is to 2(b), specifically adding language that you awarded the
20/10 parent time split and indicated that the parties could agree to more if they chose to.
THE COURT: Okay.”
Hence the claim on appeal that the Trial Court committed reversal error for failing
to provide a parenting plan is wholly without any merit whatsoever.
If there is any problem with the same, Appellant created the problem and can not
be heard on appeal challenging her own mistake. (Note Sierra above.)
Lastly, the Trial Court specifically found the joint legal custody arrangement to be
in the child’s best interest as reflected on page 253 of the Transcript where the Trial
Court made its ruling as follows:
“Custody of son, Cameron, the parties have agreed and the Court finds it in the
best interest of the child that the parties are awarded joint legal custody of the
minor child, Cameron, with primary physical custody to Ms. Sellers.”
Therefore, Appellee respectfully submits that Argument II is wholly without merit
and should be denied.
ARGUMENT THREE
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY ENTERING AMENDED
FINDINGS AND AN AMENDED DECREE THAT WERE INCONSISTENT
AND CREATED CONFUSION REGARDING PARENT TIME OF THE
MINOR CHILD’S OVERNIGHTS WITH EACH PARENT? DOES
THIS ISSUE INTERTWINE WITH THE PROBLEM OF THERE
BEING NO JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY PARENTING PLAN
SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES OR DEMANDED
BY THE COURT?

Beginning on page 21 of the Blue Brief, Appellant claims that the Trial Court
made a mistake in the parent time because it does not add up to twenty days for the
Appellant and ten days for the Appellee.
On appeal, Appellant claims that since the specified parent time does not add up
to the 20/10 split that there is ambiguity in the Amended Findings of Fact, Amended
Conclusions of Law and the Amended Decree of Divorce, requiring reversal.
COUNTER POINT I:
Appellant did not preserve this issue for trial.
On page 6 of the Blue Brief, Appellant makes the following assertion:
“ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court committing error
by entering conflicting orders of parent time was preserved at trial when the court
dealt with the recommendation of the custody evaluator and Petitioner rejected
the recommendation (R@ 682, page 36 and 37).”
The verbatim record found at page 36 and 37 of the “Transcript” show that this
issue was never raised at the time:
At the bottom of page 35, (in order to put the points raised there in context) and
continuing through the end of page 37 is the following:
MR. WALSH: This witness takes the view that there should be 20 days with
mom, 10 days with dad; that there should be joint physical and joint legal custody
and we’ll stipulate to that arrangement. I think the parties are in agreement with
that.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. WALSH: The hangup we’re having here –
THE COURT: Is the home.
MR. WALSH: Is the home. Does this kid have to stay in this brick and mortar
place or can he be in some other? Can he be in some duplex down the street and

that’s our hangup. So this is not a generic custody battle where we’re saying, run
it though the factors and run – and we argue about it all because we don’t have an
argument there. Very competent evaluation, we’re pleased with the result. We
think that’s in his best interest. The only issue is does it have to be in this home
and so I don’t know that it’s going to be helpful when you find that we’re not
asking for custody, to have spent the time going over each of those factors, is
going to be helpful to you.
MS. HUNTSMAN: And Your Honor, before we get there, my client has some
concerns about the 20-day, 10-day, the two overnights and I think it’s, I think
those are going to have be addressed as part of this. So…
THE COURT: Let me do this then. Doctor, can you give me your specific
recommendations of how you would propose the visitation go between the parties.
So you’re proposing No. 1, joint legal and physical custody between the parties,
right?
THE WITNESS: I proposed joint legal arrangement.
THE COURT: Join (sic) legal custody by both parties.
THE WITNESS: Yes sir.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: I proposed expanded visitation with dad and I didn’t make a
hard and fast recommendation. I had an aspirational recommendation but –
THE COURT: Okay, well –
THE WITNESS: -- That has that the mid-week overnight every week and
alternative weekends, Sunday to Monday, next morning. That’s an aspirational
recommendation because the child is quite anxious at about having that much
time as per his therapist and –
THE COURT: I’m lost then, what’s the 20-day, 10-day?
THE WITNESS: What that ends up –
THE COURT: Oh, you just add the totals for the month?
MR. WALSH: That’s right.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that’s how it works out.

MR. WALSH: For a 30-day period.
THE WITNESSES: That’s about how it works out.”
As noted above there is nothing at this location or elsewhere where the Appellant
preserved this issue on appeal.
Hence, Appellant has not preserved this issue for appeal, and therefore precluded
from attempting to get the issue addressed for the first time on appeal.
COUNTER POINT II:
Appellee agrees that there are problems with the actual math regarding parent
time but absolutely does not agree that that is due to confusion in how it is written up.
Appellee will more fully address Appellee’s claims in his Cross Appeal noted
below.
It is absolutely clear in the documents which parent gets what overnights as
outlined by the Court, but again Appellee has two problems with her claim:
(1) If there is an ambiguity in the documents, then such ambiguity would be
construed against Appellant as the drafter of the document, and hence the matter would
easily be resolved between the parties. Note Cherry vs. Utah State University, 966 P.2d
866, (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. vs. Blomquist, 773
P.2d 1382, (Utah, 1989) and Trolly Square Assoc. vs. Nielson, 886 P.3d 61, (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) Each holding that an ambiguity will be construed against the drafter after
extrinsic evidence is considered.
(2) If there is an ambiguity in the documents, then Appellant created the problem
and can not challenged her own mistake on appeal.
This will be addressed as Counter Point III, below.

Appellee submits that the overnights, during the school year is very clear in the
Amended Findings of Fact as found at page 610 of the Record:
“#5. Each of the parties is a fit and proper parent to be awarded joint legal
custody of the minor child, with the Petitioner being awarded primary physical
custody. Parent time shall be divided as follows:
A. The Court is adopting the 20/10 parent-time split proposed by the
custody evaluator. However, the Respondent may certainly have additional time,
if agreed upon.
B. The Respondent shall have parent time with the minor child on every
Tuesday, from the time that Cameron is out of school to and including
Wednesday morning when the child goes to school.
C. The Respondent shall have every other weekend beginning from the
time that Cameron is out of school on Friday to and including Monday morning
when the child goes to school.
D. The parties shall be bound by 30-3-35 of the Utah Code Annotated
regarding the additional times that the Respondent shall have parent-time with the
minor child.”
Hence, it is absolutely clear which parent would get which overnight.
Appellant can not argue that there is something unclear about which parent gets
Tuesday over nights, nor can she argue that there is something unclear about which
parent gets over nights on the Sunday evening where the weekend belongs to the Father.
Hence, the claim raised now by the Appellant that somehow the Amended
Findings, Amended Conclusions and the Amended Decree of Divorce are unclear and
therefore requiring reversal of the Trial Court is wholly without merit.
COUNTER POINT III:
If there is a problem with the clarity of the Amended Findings of Fact, Amended
Conclusions of Law and the Amended Decree of Divorce, the Appellant created her own
problem and can not raise the same as a basis for appeal. (Note Sierra above)

Appellee incorporates herein the more full discussion of this principle addressed
above.
COUNTER POINT IV:
A careful reading of Argument Three is that the father actually has more
overnights with the minor child than a strict twenty overnights with Mom and a strict ten
overnights with Dad, each month.
The absurdity of Appellant’s argument is that Appellant is claiming that the
exactitude in the math should be more important to the Court than promoting the best
interests of the minor child by focusing on the maximum parent time in the father.
As noted on page 253 of the Transcript, all the Trial Court did was adopt the
agreement reached by the parties as found in the Court’s ruling:
“Custody of son, Cameron, the parties have agreed and the Court finds it
in the best interest of the child that the parties are awarded joint legal custody of
the minor child, Cameron, with primary physical custody to Ms. Sellers. The
Court will adopt the recommendation proposed by the expert on the 20/10 split of
the visitation. The parties are free to do a more aggressive schedule if they desire
to do so and the Court so encourages that. The Court does fully understand that it
is perhaps slightly more than the statutory guidelines and that the parties may not
be able to get their son to agree but at least it gives them a tool or an
encouragement for both of them to have him spend as much time with his father
as has been recommended.”
Appellee submits that there are two real clear messages in the Courts ruling and
neither one of them center around limiting Father’s parent time: (1) The Court intended
to have the child “spend as much time with his father” as could be arranged and (2) the
20/10 split was intended to be a very general thing and frankly just a way for the parties
to be able to share their time with their son. Mom would get approximately twice the
amount of time with child as would Father.

Hence, to suggest to this Court that all of this is confusing as Father is getting a
lot more time with the Child than is in standard parent time, so this Court must reverse
and give Mom sole custody and Dad standard parent time.
As noted above the 20/10 split was evidence put on by the Appellant’s Attorney
calling Valerie Hale to the stand. She did not want to limit Dad’s parent time in any way,
but wanted the exact opposite extreme. Kind of like the Court at page 253, suggesting
that “lets give Dad as much time as the child will allow.”
Appellee respectfully submits that the determination by the Court for the very
specific parent time, written up by Appellant’s Counsel, is exactly what the Court
intended and is based on the best interests of the minor child, and there is absolutely no
basis for the Appellate Court to change anything about it.
There is no basis whatsoever to suggest that this Appellate Court must reverse
with instructions to award Mom with sole custody and standard parent time in Dad.
ARGUMENT FOUR
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT
NEITHER PARTY WAS AWARDED ALIMONY FROM THE OTHER,
EITHER NOW OR IN THE FUTURE?
Appellee agrees that this issue was preserved by the Appellant at the Trial Court
level.
Appellant claims, beginning on page 26 of the Appellant’s Blue Brief, that the
Trial Court committed reversible error by not awarding alimony now and forever barring
alimony in the future.
At the close of evidence and argument of Counsel, the Court ruled on certain
matters and then took other issues, including alimony under advisement.

Then on February 25, 2008, the Court issued a minute entry and addressed the
alimony issue at page 440 of the Record, as follows:
“2. The Court declines to take into the alimony determination the Petitioner’s
request to have the Respondent pay her money for a post-divorce savings
investment or retirement account for her. The Court specifically finds the
Petitioner’s financial needs do not establish that she should be awarded alimony.
The Petitioner has been awarded the marital home and it is free and clear of all
debts and mortgages. Petitioner earns $4,031.82 per month. The Petitioner’s car
has no debt thereon and she has demonstrated her total monthly living expenses in
the approximate $2,100 per month range, leaving her approximately $1,000 per
month for discretionary spending and investment or retirement, as she so chooses.
The Court specifically finds that the financial conditions and needs of the
recipient spouse do not require alimony for the reasons set forth above. In
addition, recipient’s earning capacity and ability to produce income is more than
adequate to maintain her in the lifestyle to which she is accustomed. In addition,
in relatively a few months, the recipient will have earned a masters degree which
will also increase her income. The Court finds that respondent would have the
ability to pay some support. The Court has taken into consideration the length of
the marriage, and the fact that the parties have both worked during the marriage.”
COUNTER POINT I:
Appellant makes no claim that the Court somehow committed reversible error by
not considering the three pronged test found in Jones vs. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah,
1985).
Appellee submits that in determining alimony the most that the Trial Court can
award in alimony is the demonstrated needs of the receiving spouse.
Three factors have long been considered, and must always be considered,
before awarding alimony: (1) the financial needs and condition of the recipient
spouse; (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for
himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. See
Davis vs. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) (citing Jones vs. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1985) and Bakanoswki vs. Bankanowski 80 P.3d 153, 2003 UT App 357.
If the trial court considers these factors in setting an award of alimony, we
will not disturb it award absent a showing that such a serious inequity has resulted
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.” Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424.

The trial court concluded that Wife “has demonstrated a need for alimony
in the amount of $1,000 per month, as the cost of equalize her standard of living
to that of (Husband’s).” As explained in Martinez vs. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538
(Utah 1991), (u)sually the need of the spouses are assessed in light of the standard
of living they had during marriage.” Id. At 542. Here, the trial court never
determined the Wife’s needs based upon the historical standard of living. Instead,
the trial court engaged in an effort to simply equalize income. In attempting to
equalize the parties income rather than going through the traditional needs
analysis, the trial court abused its discretion. See Bingham vs. Bingham, 872 P.2d
1065, (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (hold that trial court “should not have awarded
plaintiff more than her established needs required, regardless of the defendant’s
ability to pay this excess amount” and remanding “for a reassessment of the
alimony award in accordance with the precept that the spouse’s demonstrated
need must, under Jones, constitute the maximum permissible alimony award”).
Furthermore, Appellee makes no claim that the Court failed to consider the
provisions of 30-3-5(8) of the Utah Code Annotated, which provides:
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by
the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles
and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at
the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of
living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both,
that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been

greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the
court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered,
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share
living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years
that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.
Appellee submits that the Appellant has not stated any legal basis for the
Appellate Court to reverse the Trial Court.
Appellee submits that the Trial Court actually understated the enviable financial
condition of the Appellant.
For example, the Appellant admitted on the stand at page 1, that she was getting a
home with a stipulated value of $290,000.00 with no debt on the same.
That on page 108 of the Record Appellant submitted her sworn financial
statement showing that she needs $2,687.00 per month to live on, which included some
$215.00 per month for gifts and donations, $100.00 per month for entertainment, $520.00
for food for herself and minor son, (who would be with Dad ten days out of every month,
minimum) and $119.00 for her water bill every month, etc.

At page 102 of the Transcsript she testified that she was making $48,381.00 per
year and that her income would go up significantly when she would get her Masters
Degree in the next few months.
Appellee submits that there is good reason why Appellant cited no legal basis for
reversing the Trial Court’s determination to not award Appellant with any alimony now
or in the future, and the reason why that is so is because there is no legal basis to
challenge the Trial Court’s determination.
Appellant is actually set for life and can not deny the same either at the Trial
Court level nor here at the Appellate Court level.
Appellee submits that there is no basis to reverse the determination made by the
Trial Court.
ARGUMENT FIVE
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN ITS DETERMINATIONS THAT
JOANN WAS TO RECEIVE NO ALIMONY FROM GLEN BECAUSE
SHE HAD NO NEED AND BECAUSE GLEN’S ABILITY
TO PAY HAD NOT BEEN CALCULATED?
The majority of the Appellant’s argument centers around her criticism of the
Amended Findings of Fact.
For example on page 28 of the blue brief, she states:
“Many of the findings of the Court’s amended findings of fact are really
conclusions of law and JoAnn contends that the trial court was deficient in
making adequate findings to support its conclusions.”
COUNTER POINT I:
The Amended Findings of Fact and the Amended Conclusions of Law were
created by Appellant’s own Counsel.

A simple review of the record beginning at page 610, shows that Diana J.
Huntsman prepared the same.
Appellant can not create a problem and then sustain an appeal based upon her
own conduct. (Note Sierra above)
COUNTER POINT II:
There is no need to consider the ability of Mr. Sellers to pay alimony to Mrs.
Sellers, if there is no need for any contribution from Mr. Sellers.
At page 440 of the Record is the Minute Entry by the Trial Court regarding
alimony:
“The Court specifically finds the Petitioner’s financial needs do not establish that
she should be awarded alimony. The Petitioner has been awarded the marital
home and it is free and clear of all debts and mortgages. Petitioner earns
$4,031.82 per month. The Petitioner’s car has no debt thereon and she has
demonstrated her total monthly living expenses in the approximate $2,100 per
month range, leaving her approximately $1,000 per month for discretionary
spending and investment or retirement, as she so chooses. The Court specifically
finds that the financial conditions and the needs of the recipient spouse do not
require alimony for reasons set forth above. In addition, recipient’s earning
capacity and ability to produce income is more than adequate to maintain her in
the lifestyle to which she is accustomed. In addition, in relatively a few months,
the recipient will have earned a masters degree which will also increase her
income. The Court finds that respondent would have the ability to pay some
support. The Court has taken into consideration the length of the marriage, and
the facts that the parties have both worked during the marriage.”
The Appellee submits that rosy picture described by the Court is in fact an
understatement for the following reasons:
At page 194 and following in the Transcript Appellant admitted that she would be
the better parent for custody purposes because she can be home in the afternoon when the
minor would be out of school. Hence, she is only required to work for part of the day.

Furthermore, not only does the Appellant work just part of the day, she only
works part of the year.
At page 207 and elsewhere in the record that she admitted that she gets the
summer time off.
At page 102 of the Transcript she testified that she is making $48,381.00 per
month and that that figure would go to $56,000 when she gets her Masters but that that
figure was for teaching. (Note transcript at page 190)
However, she established at page 193 that the Masters Degree could mean even
more to her if she chose not to teach but be in administration.
In addition her retirement is already vested and worth over a third of a million
dollars.
At page 205 of the Transcript is the following:
Q. (BY MR. WALSH) In summary you’ll see the figure is $780,000, whatever
figure it would be and under the theory here, you can have half of that,
whatever he wouldn’t have done premarital, correct? You’d be entitled to
half?
A. Yes.
Q. So somewhere around $700,000 approximate divided between the two of you
and so you’re going to have approximately $350,000 in retirement program
already vested, already paid for, 100 percent yours, right.
A. I think so.
In addition to the $350,000.00 plus, that the Appellant would get as part of the
division of the Appellee’s retirement account Appellant would get half of her own 401(k)
which had a total value of $9,761.47; half of her own pension which had a total value of
$55,970; Appellant would get half of the Merrill Lynch account which has a total value

of $30,559.35 and the Appellant would get half of Ameriprise Account worth $8,856.72.
(Note Transcript at page 120 and following).
Appellee respectfully submits that the claims by the Appellant are just “pure
greed”, as the Courts are generally overwhelmed with parties that are getting divorced
because of extreme financial problems.
The District Courts routinely have to find a way for parties to maintain two
separate households post-divorce, on very limited income which pre-divorce, was unable
to sustain even one.
Here the Appellant has a house worth $290,000 which is free and clear
(Transcript at page 1), which is fully furnished to the tune of as much as $15,000 worth
of furniture, which is also paid off, (Transcript at page 229 and following), a late make
car fully paid for, income at about $56,000 per year with working part of the day and
with full summers off, retirement of $350,000 plus in addition to all of the other pension
and other savings programs outlined above (not including additional retirement that she
was generating on her own) and with monthly expenses of only $2,100.00.
Yet on top of this Appellant claims that she is entitled to alimony so she can
invest the same for more money in the bank waiting for her to retire.
The provisions of 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated require the Trial Court to
consider the following:
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by
the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles
and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at
the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of
living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both,
that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the
court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered,
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share
living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years
that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.
Here the Trial Court appropriately denied alimony as should the Appellate Court.

ARGUMENT SIX
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY DECLING TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT IN ITS ALIMONY DETERMINATION JOANN’S REQUEST TO
HAVE GLEN PAY POST-DIVORCE SAVINGS AND/OR RETIREMENT
MONIES TO HER.
At page 34, Appellant argues:
“Therefore, the trial court erred not only in its determination that no alimony
should be awarded but also in its determination that the parties’ post-divorce
savings and retirement income should have not been allowed to be calculated as
part of Petitioner’s need for alimony.”
At page 440 of the Record, the Trial Court Judge wrote in his Minute Entry as
follows:
“The Court declines to take into the alimony determination the Petitioner’s
request to have the Respondent pay her money for a post-divorce savings
investment or retirement account for her. The Court specifically finds the
Petitioner’s financial needs do not establish that she should be awarded alimony.
The Petitioner has been awarded the marital home and it is free and clear of all
debts and mortgages. Petitioner earns $4,031.82 per month. The Petitioner’s car
has no debt thereon and she has demonstrated her total monthly living expenses in
the approximate $2,100 per month range, leaving her approximately $1,000 per
month for discretionary spending and investment or retirement, as she so chooses.
The Court specifically finds that the financial conditions and the needs of the
recipient spouse do not require alimony for reasons set forth above. In addition,
recipient’s earning capacity and ability to produce income is more than adequate
to maintain her in the lifestyle to which she is accustomed. In addition, in
relatively a few months, the recipient will have earned a masters degree which
will also increase her income. The Court finds that respondent would have the
ability to pay some support. The Court has taken into consideration the length of
the marriage, and the facts that the parties have both worked during the marriage.”
Appellee submits that what is most troubling about this argument that the savings
accounts that the parties had should be divided is that Appellant unilaterially divided the
same at the time of separation, and then wanted the District Court and now this Court to
re-divide what Appellee saved from time of separation to time of divorce.

Beginning at page 185 of the Transcript, on Cross Examination, Appellant stated
the following:
Q. (BY MR. WALSH) You show the America First account on Page 3 of this
financial declaration and you’re telling the Court when you swear that it’s true
and that it was already divided, right?
A. Yeah, I divided what was in the American (sic) First account.
Q. And you got $10,000.
A. Well, there was two accounts.
Q. Let’s stay with just the one the one we’ve got, the $10,000.
A. That $10,000 didn’t all come out of the America First account.
Q. Were there two America First Accounts?
A. No.
THE COURT: Let’s just stay on the America First account and then we can
move to other accounts.
Q. (BY MR. WALSH) How much did you get out of the America First
Account?
A. I don’t know because I’d have to look at my records. If you would allow me
to tell you how I did it then you could understand.
Q. All I want to know did you already divide it then and take your half then? Is
that what happened?
A. Yes.
Q. But now you make a claim on whatever he’s been able to save since then, isn’t
that where we are today?
A. A claim on what he has saved…
Q. In the America First account, right?
A. Umm –
MR. WALSH: So stipulate, counsel?

MS. HUNTSMAN: So stipulate. We subtracted out the amount that they
separated, that they split.
MR. WALSH: Deseret First, you stipulate to that, counsel?
MS. HUTSMAN: We subtracted out the amount that they each received and the
rest should be split, yes.
THE COURT: So what I understand is they are making a claim for what was put
into the account after it was already divided once between the parties.
MS. HUNTSMAN: Correct.
Appellee submits that part of the reasoning by the Court in declining to award
alimony and attorneys fees is found at page 441 in the Record where the Court addressed
both:
“Both parties are ordered to pay their own attorney’s fees and costs. The Court
declines to award attorney’s fees on the basis that there is no evidence of a
financial need on the part of the Petitioner. In addition, it appears that much of
the litigation that has occurred has been asserted by the Petitioner against
Respondent were false allegations regarding child abuse. In addition, the Court
has determined and was determined by the experts this claim of abuse to be
completely groundless and without any foundation whatsoever.”
Appellee submits that part of the analysis included the idea that while JoAnn
Sellers was pointing her finger at Mr. Sellers and all of his faults and imperfections, she
herself “admitted to having intense romantic feelings for another female.” Note
Transcript at page 43.
In fact, JoAnn Sellers homosexual problems caused the other woman to be either
fired or transferred to another school, due to the advances that JoAnn Sellers were
making toward her homosexual partner.
At page 70 of the Transcript, Dr. Valerie Hale, testified about this homosexual
relationship of JoAnn Sellers as follows:

Q. Did anybody lose their job over her relationship?
A. I’m not aware if there was a job loss or if people were transferred to different
schools but I don’t get a sense anyone was fired.
The reason why the homosexual relationship of JoAnn Sellers was so relevant to
the Court is that JoAnn Sellers was trying to advance her alimony claim by asserting that
Glen Sellers was at fault by causing the divorce to come to a head.
Fault is a factor under 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated and JoAnn Sellers was
attempting to get the Trial Court to rule that Glen Sellers was to be blamed for the
divorce, thereby advancing a basis to award JoAnn Sellers with alimony.
After all of the dust settled, the Court concluded in reference to the alleged fault
of Glen Sellers as was reflected in the final minute entry which stated, “. . . the Court has
determined and was determined by the experts this claim of abuse to be completely
groundless and without any foundation whatsoever.”
Hence, the Trial Court determined that JoAnn Sellers had caused the Divorce to
cost so much, on completely groundless accusations and therefore the Court was not
going to require the Appellee to pay even a dime of her attorneys fees.
CONCLUSION
Appellee respectfully submits that the Appellant’s claims are without merit and
not asserted in good faith.
Many of the claims are claims regarding Appellant’s own Counsel failing to
prepare appropriate findings. Many of the claims were not preserved at the Trial Court
level. Claims regarding alimony, etc., are particularly baseless as there is no showing
where there was any need whatsoever and without need for any alimony such is
dispositive of the whole analysis.

Appellee respectfully requests that the claims of the Appellant all be denied and
that this Court remand the matter to the District Court to determine an appropriate
attorneys fee to be paid by the Appellant to the Appellee.
CROSS APPEAL
ARGUMENT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT MISCALCULATED CHILD SUPPORT
In this action the Trial Court determined child support at page 623 of the Record.
The Amended Decree of Divorce provides in paragraph #7 as follows:
“7. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support in the amount of
$729.26 per month.”
At page 578 of the Record, the Appellee/Cross Appellant raised this exact issue
with the Trial Court, wherein he raised the following objections to the Findings of Fact
and referencing each Finding that Respondent objected as follows:
#7. The Respondent has the child 152 over nights as reflected in Exhibit A
attached hereto.
#9. The Petitioner now has earnings of $58,866.96 per year due to a pay increase.
#11. The child support does not contemplate the overnights the Respondent has
with the minor child as reflected in Exhibit A attached hereto, and child support
should be $485.56 as shown on the Work Sheet attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Respondent also objected to the following paragraphs of the Decree of Divorce,
found at page 578 of the Record:
#4. The Respondent has the child 152 over nights as reflected in Exhibit A
attached hereto.
#7. The child support should be $485.56, when the overnights are factored in as
reflected on Exhibit A and Exhibit B attached.
The Trial Court determined child support at page 253 of the Transcript as follows:

“The Court finds that the petitioner has an income of $4,032. gross and that the
respondent’s income is $7,920 gross resulting in a child support obligation total
between both parties of $1,157; thus, based upon a credit for the 20/10 split as
outlined in the new schedules found under Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, the petitioner’s
portion of her obligation is $393.38 per month and the respondent’s portion is
$729.26 after giving credits as outlined on the worksheet.”
Appellee/Cross Appellant submits that child support should have been determined
at $485.56.
Appellee/Cross Appellant submits that the easiest way to establish the
miscalculation is in the determination of the overnights that the Appellee/Cross Appellant
would have in a given year.
The following Findings of Fact, establish the amount of overnights as follows:
5. B. The Respondent shall have parent time with the minor child on every
Tuesday, from the time that Cameron is out of school to and including
Wednesday morning when the child goes to school.
5. C. The Respondent shall have every other weekend beginning from the time
that Cameron is out of school on Friday to and including Monday morning when
the child goes to school.
5. D. The parties shall be bound by 30-3-35 of the Utah Code Annotated
regarding the additional times that the Respondent shall have parent-time with the
minor child.
6. The parties shall be bound by the provisions of 30-3-33 of the Utah Code
Annotated. However, the first option to provide child care will apply only if the
other parent is unavailable for a period of 4 hours or more.
7. By virtue of the foregoing, the Respondent shall have a total of one hundred
and twenty-two (122) over nights each year and the Petitioner shall have a total of
two hundred and forty-three (243) over nights each year.
As a result of the foregoing, Appellee/Cross Appellant would have a total of the
following overnights during the school year (Please note that the Finding specifically
references “out of school” in the subject Findings:
5. B. – September through May – Every Tuesday Evening - Total - 39

5. C - September through May – Every other weekend Friday Evening, Saturday
Evening and Sunday Evening – Total – 63
5.D. – Holidays and Summertime as defined in 30-3-35 – Total -61 based upon
the following criteria:
(f) In years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the
following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3
p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other
siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m.
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iii) spring break beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for the holiday
until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes;
(iv) July 4 beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. or no later
than 6 p.m. on the day following the holiday, at the option of the parent exercising
the holiday;
(v) Labor Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely entitled;
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend
beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely entitled;
(vii) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7
p.m. on the holiday; and
(viii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) including Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1
p.m. on the day halfway through the holiday, if there are an odd number of days
for the holiday period, or until 7 p.m. if there are an even number of days for the
holiday period, so long as the entire holiday is equally divided.
(g) In years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the
following holidays:
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the
discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the
birthday;
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iii) Memorial Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m.,
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial
parent is completely entitled;

(iv) July 24 beginning at 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. or
no later than 6 p.m. on the day following the holiday, at the option of the parent
exercising the holiday;
(v) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m.
on the holiday;
(vi) Halloween on October 31 or the day Halloween is traditionally celebrated
in the local community from after school until 9 p.m. if on a school day, or from 4
p.m. until 9 p.m.;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7
p.m.; and
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b), beginning 1 p.m. on the day halfway through the
holiday, if there are an odd number of days for the holiday period, or at 7 p.m. if
there are an even number of days for the holiday period, so long as the entire
Christmas holiday is equally divided.
(h) The custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and
the even year holidays in odd years.
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday.
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday.
(k) Extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent,
including weekends normally exercised by the noncustodial parent, but not
holidays;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial
parent for weekday parent-time but not weekends, except for a holiday to be
exercised by the other parent.
(l) The custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for
purposes of vacation.
Hence, Appellee/Cross Appellant would be entitled to a total of 163 overnights in
a given year.
Finding of Fact #7, shows the miscalculation made by the Trial Court:
“By virtue of the foregoing, the Respondent shall have a total of one hundred and
twenty-two (122) over nights each year and the Petitioner shall have a total of two
hundred and forty-three (243) over nights each year.”
As shown above the ratio would be 163 overnights for the Appellee/Cross
Appellant and 202 overnights for the Appellant.

Appellee/Cross Appellant respectfully submits that by virtue of the foregoing
child support should have been established at $485.56
ARGUMENT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO FACTOR
TAX CONSEQUENCES IN THE BALANCING OF THE EQUITIES
As shown on page 258 of the Transcript, the Trial Court intended to divide the
equity in the home and then balance the Appellee’s interest in the home against the
retirement accounts, thereby granting to the Appellant all of the parties interest in the
marital home and granting to the Appellee a corresponding amount in the retirement
programs.
At page 258 of the transcript is the following:
“The Court is going to value the house at $290,000.00 based upon what the
appraisals were. So $290,000 divided by two will give each party $145,000
equity into the home. The first thing – so what we’re going to do, Mr. Walsh, if
it’s okay, put $145,000 for your client’s equity interest in the home and then
we’re going to start subtracting and adding from that figure which is half, okay?
Does that make sense?”
Appellee challenged this approach with the Trial Court at page 14 and following
of the Transcript of the hearing on June 2, 2008:
MR. WALSH: Appreciate your patience with us, Judge. It’s our belief, Your
Honor, at least we hope that you’ll see it this way, that you intended that there be
a factor in the analysis of taking money out of the 401K and the penalties and the
other things that are associated with that event versus having 100 per cent equity
in the home in pure cash as we laid out in our memorandum, he’s in a 28 percent
tax liability on the 401K. He wanted – the testimony before Your Honor is he
wanted to get his own home and so now to do this with the retirement of the
401K, this is going to have a 28 per cent federal tax consequence.
THE COURT: Back up. Why is the 290 going to have that – that’s the home
value not the 401K, right.
MR. WALSH: What we did, Judge, is we –

THE COURT: Yeah (inaudible).
MR. WALSH: -- she can have the whole home now, that’s your ruling.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. WALSH: She gets the house and we correspondingly give him his value in
the 401K.
THE COURT: That’s right.
MR. WALSH: So if he takes his value out of the 401K, he’s got a 28 per cent tax
liability to do that.
THE COURT: I’m with you.
MR. WALSH: Cause he wants to have a house now because he wants to have
these times with his boy. He’s only got another four years approximately to be
with his son. He wants to have a stable environment for his boy.
THE COURT: I’m with you.
MR. WALSH: He also has a 10 percent –
THE COURT: Penalty.
MR. WALSH: -- on the state level. So he’s there now at 38 percent for the
taking it out at this particular point. So it was our intent, Your Honor, it was out
(sic) understanding – it’s one thing over here to say we’re not going to give you
return on your investment. The house I would say three or four times the value
from this event to this event and say we’re going to give you zero here. But when
you go the other way around, he’s got a 38 percent detriment over here.
Apellee/Cross Appellant submits that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
Court judge to overlook the tax consequences in the determination of the equities.
This argument is fortified in the analysis by the Trial Court in dividing the equity
in the home.
At page 248 and following the Trial Court gave the Petitioner two choices in
either keeping the home or waiting until Cameron turn eighteen and then selling the
home.

Please note in the transcript the reference by the Court to the tax consequences in
selling the home:
THE COURT: Two choices. Considering giving her the home and
adjusting out the respondent’s equity in the home by awarding him more in the
retirement accounts. So if she wants the home free and clear of any right, claim,
title or interest to him and the right and the equity and the value that he has in the
home gets shifted over into his column in the retirement/savings accounts. That’s
Option 1. That way, nobody is required to finance, she’s not required to go out
and have additional expenses for living either in an apartment or to refinance the
mortgage. That’s a choice.
The other option is to leave the home as is until Cameron is 18 at which
point in time the parties will sell the home and split the equity as I describe and
determine with each party paying one-half of the taxes for the real property
and each party parting (sic) one half of the insurance on the home because you
could consider it an investment for either party during the four years until the
child reaches age 18 at which time they split it. The investment may go up, it
may go down. So if they’re going to walk away with half the proceeds, they
should carry both half the expense to pay the tax on it or and/or carry the
insurance to protest the asset. All other expense for the maintenance, care and
upgrade of the home would be born by your client during those four years. Give
me your thoughts of those. (Emphasis added)
Hence, the Trial Court was abundantly fair is splitting the tax consequences in the
division of the equity regarding the marital home.
Appellee/Cross Appellant respectfully submits that it was an abuse of discretion
for the Trial Court to refuse to factor the tax consequences on the quid pro quo for the
equity in the marital home, ie: $150,000 offset in the retirement.
Appellee/Cross Appellant would have a 38 per cent tax on $150,000.00, which
would be $57,000.00.
In this action, the Appellant made a claim for taxes she paid on the marital
residence during the time that she lived in the marital home after the Respondent left.
This amount was around $4,500.00 approximately.

The Trial Court, in an abundance of fairness and equity, required that each side
bear half of the property taxes on the marital home while Appellant used the same.
At page 259 of the Transcript is the following:
THE COURT: First thing we’re going to do is subtract out of the defendant’s
equity $2,284.45 for real estate taxes. That’s half of the real estate taxes that have
been covered on the property in those years. According to my calculations, that
gives him $142,715.35.
Appellee/Cross Appellant submits that the very first thing the Trial Court did in
dividing the equities was requiring the Respondent to pay half of the taxes incurred while
the Appellant alone occupied the marital home.
Appellee/Cross Appellant submits that it would have been much more fair to
require the Petitioner to pay all of the taxes on the marital home that she alone occupied.
Respondent had to pay rent for a substitute place to stay.
Appellant occupied the home during that time frame and should have been
required to pay for what she used, just like he had to pay for what he used.
Notwithstanding, the Trial Court made each party pay half of the real property
taxes which amounted to a mere $4,568.90.
In sharp contrast the Appellee/Cross Appellant was required to pay $57,000 for
taxes for his equity on property that he had not used.
The Trial Court considered the rent, etc. under Option one above as no small
matter, when the Court stated, on page 248 of the Transcript:
“Option 1. That way, nobody is required to finance, she’s not required to go out
and have additional expenses for living either in an apartment or to refinance the
mortgage.”
Cross Appellant acknowledges that the Trial Court has broad discretion in the
division the marital estate and that the Appellate Courts will not disturb the Trial Courts’

determination absent a finding of an abuse of that discretion. Note Burnham vs.
Burnham, 716 P.2d 781 (Utah, 1986).
Here the Trial Court balanced the equities and then granted to the Wife a
$2,284.45 off set against the Appellee’s interest in the marital home, for taxes that
accrued during the time that the parties were separated, when she alone occupied the
home.
This is not a case, where the court factored in the taxes in the original division of
the equities, rather this is a matter where the Court balanced the equities first and then
refused to grant any kind of offset to the Husband for the taxes he would suffer.
It is important to note on appeal that the $57,000.00 tax consequence suffered by
the Cross Appellant has never been challenged.
That $57,000.00 loss sustained by the Cross Appellant is not disputed by the
Cross Appellee.
The unfairness of this result is best seen when applied to actual parties, as $57,000
may not be a big dial to some folks.
However, here the Husband’s $57,000.00 loss is approximately an entire year’s
salary of the Respondent. That would be gross earnings for the entire year.
This clearly was a manifest injustice to the Cross Appellant.
Cross Appellant submits that typically the Trial Court will take all of the factors
into consideration and then balance the equities as best they can.
Here, the analysis is different, the Trial Court divided the equities and then
granted to the Wife a $2,284.45 concession on the property tax generated on the marital

home, but then refused to grant to the Cross Appellant any kind of consideration or offset
for the undisputed $57,000.00 he had to sustain.
Appellee/Cross Appellant respectfully submits that it was a clear abuse of
discretion by the Trial Court to refuse to factor the tax consequences in the division of the
equities, thereby requiring the Cross Appellant to pay all $57,000.00 of the tax
consequence he was facing, while at the same time granting a concession to the Cross
Appellee for the $4,568.90 tax consequence she was facing.
CONCLUSION
Cross Appellant submits that it was reversible error to not determine child support
to be $485.56.
Additionally it was manifestly unfair to require the Husband to pay all of the
undisputed $57,000.00 while at the same time requiring the he pay half of the property
taxes of $4,568.90.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellee/Cross Appellant requests that the Appellate Court sustain the Trial
Court’s determination regarding Appellant’s claims, but reverse and remand to the Trial
Court for a correct determination of child support and for an equitable division of the
$57,000.00 tax consequence as well as for a determination of the amount of an award of
Attorneys Fees for Appellee on appeal.
Dated this 10th day of March, 2010.
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